MANIFOLD
Will China attempt to invade Taiwan by the end of 2027?
554
Ṁ2.4kṀ170k
2027
17%
chance

This market will resolve "yes" if there is a Chinese military attack with the intention to invade Taiwan by the end of 2027.

This question is answered "No" if there is:

  • no military conflict between the two parties

  • a limited military conflict without triggering a major war

On the one hand, this time span approximately reaches the maximum forecast range (~<5 years), as Philip E. Tetlock in his book Superforecasting: the art and science of prediction. Moreover, 2027 is the year in which, as frequently reported, China wants to seek military capabilities to successfully invade Taiwan without saying that it will act accordingly.

"[...] Admiral John Aquilino, says China wants to finish modernising its armed forces by 2027. The timeline is shrinking, he told the Senate in March.

https://www.economist.com/china/2022/09/01/a-weak-china-may-be-more-warlike-than-a-strong-one

The year Davidson sees as the potential time horizon for a Chinese attack, 2027, is the centenary of the People’s Liberation Army. In November 2020, the Chinese Communist party said it wanted to “ensure that the 100-year military building goal is achieved by 2027”, called for faster military modernisation and reiterated the goal of making the Chinese military fit for networked, “intelligentised” warfare. Although those are stock phrases China has used before, the Pentagon calls 2027 a “new milestone”. “If realised, the PLA’s 2027 modernisation goals could provide Beijing with more credible military options in a Taiwan contingency,” it said in its annual report on the Chinese military last year. Some analysts doubt Davidson’s date. But one year on from his testimony, government and military officials in both Taipei and Washington say the window from now to 2027 is a genuine threat.

[...]
One person familiar with the administration’s assessment of the threat to Taiwan says there is general agreement that China is aiming to have developed the necessary capabilities to attack by 2027, but argues that is very distinct from the question of intent or action.

https://www.ft.com/content/0850eb67-1700-47c0-9dbf-3395b4e905fd

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bought Ṁ1,500 NO

@Gurkenglas https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/open-hidden-open-thread-4235/comment/223513107 :

Reportedly, the Chinese were taken off guard by the massive strike on Iran. Their conventional wisdom was that the US would at most try for the nuclear processing center again. Planners weren't prepared for the US moves. Now they have to deal with the fact that Iran's oil isn't flowing to China; it could (will?) disrupt their economy. And the Iran fiasco has proved that Chinese weapons systems, which they sold to Iran, can't stand up to US weapons. The old guard & the reformers are very concerned. And Xi may not make it to the 21st Party Congress in 2027. Even is Xi wins his political battles, he won't be able to move against Taiwan in the foreseeable future.

beowulf888 on Astral Codex Ten
Fog of War stuff. Unfortunately, so much has been going on, that I haven't bookmarked everything I should. Here are some interesting tidbits to consider that may or may not be true. IRAN: 1. Is Mojtaba Khamenei really in charge now? He was the chosen successor to his father, and the Assembly of Experts was meeting to elect him Supreme Leader, thereby destroying the quorum required to make his selection legal. Supposedly, the surviving members met by phone the next day, and under IRG pressure, elected him. But rumors were that many clerics didn't like being strong-armed by the IRG, and they questioned whether he had the clerical credentials to be Supreme Leader. And there are constitutional questions about whether enough members of the Assembly of Experts remain to make the election valid. AFAIK, Western and Middle Eastern media seem to be hedging their bets and are wording it as Mojtaba Khamenei is "set to be chosen as Supreme Leader." Of course, the Israelis took out the offices Iranian TV network in Tehran, so if he were officially elected, the Assembly may have difficulty getting the announcement out. 2. The entire IRG senior command seems to have been taken out (according to Israeli sources). Regional missile commands seem to be functioning independently, which may be the reason we've seen missiles and drones being launched at every surrounding country except Afghanistan, forcing Gulf States, which would have preferred to stay on the sidelines, to react to the attacks. 3. But missile and drone attacks have been falling day by day. Quoting the X post below, "Clear downward trend: Peak saturation early (Day 1-2), then sharp drop as U.S. | Israeli strikes destroy missiles, TELs, storage depots, other launch infrastructure and crews." https://x.com/UKikaski/status/2029300058017972422/photo/1 And there is some question about whether they have many more stockpiled, having sold the majority of their stock to Putin. 4. Why hasn't Trump pushed for Reza Pahlavi's return? He has a sizeable network of followers in Iran, and he's posted a sample constitution and reconstruction plan for Iran. Pahlavi would become a constitutional monarch and lead the transitional government under his plan. Does Pahlavi not have enough resources to bribe Trump to support him? And Trump claimed their preferred successor (unnamed) was killed in the attacks. Hmmm. CHINA: 5. Western media and analysts haven't really absorbed the fact that Xi's removal of two of the three top leaders of the PLA had functionally decapitated the PLA military command. Generals Zhang Youxia & Liu Zhenli were removed (arrested? killed?) back in January. This only leaves a political apparatchik appointed by Xi at the top level of the PLA. Xi also purged their immediate subordinates, and State Media said that regional military leaders were instructed to remain on base and attend political training classes. This didn't happen, and various military commands announced maneuvers (with lots of videos being posted on X and other social media of troops marching in formation). Things have quieted down, but... 6. ...but the Political Bureau of the CPC hasn't endorsed Xi's autogolpe (top-down coup). They declined to officially remove Zhang Youxia & Liu Zhenli from their leadership roles at a Politburo meeting at the beginning of February and a second meeting last week. Under the operating framework of the CPC removal of disgraced officials from their positions is necessary before there can be formal trials. Zhang Youxia & Liu Zhenli are suspected to be dead. But there should be an announcement of support for Xi, and that hasn't happened. 7. Rumor is that the Xi faction has pissed off the Old Guard, plus a group of what they call the Reformers. Xi had already purged a bunch of Reformers from the PLA. Although Zhang Youxia & Liu Zhenli got their promotions from Xi, the Old Guard had come to regard them as their own. And notably, Zhang had been cautioning Xi that the PLA wasn't prepared to retake Taiwan. 8. And at last week's meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPC, they struck from the rolls a bunch of PLA regional command officers in the Southeast Region who were perceived as Xi supporters, and would have been the ones coordinating any invasion of Taiwan. 9. Around the same time, state media let it be known that Xi would be OK with the Taiwan status quo if the US didn't sell them advanced military systems. Also, Xi was supposed to host Trump in Beijing for a summit at the end of this month. He invited Trump soon after the initial meeting of the Political Bureau failed to endorse his autogolpe of generals Zhang & Liu, probably to boost his perception as a leader with capable international chops. Chinese and US representatives were supposed to meet in one of the Gulf States to work out the arrangements for Trump's State visit, but the Iran strikes and instability in the Gulf region have thrown those plans out the window. It will be interesting to see whether Xi continues to extend the invitation, because it could be perceived by Chinese hardliners as kowtowing to Trump after the Iran fiasco. And if he cancels, the Chinese perception is that American hardliners will perceive it as weakness on Xi's part. This is a no-win situation for Xi. 10. Reportedly, the Chinese were taken off guard by the massive strike on Iran. Their conventional wisdom was that the US would at most try for the nuclear processing center again. Planners weren't prepared for the US moves. Now they have to deal with the fact that Iran's oil isn't flowing to China; it could (will?) disrupt their economy. And the Iran fiasco has proved that Chinese weapons systems, which they sold to Iran, can't stand up to US weapons. The old guard & the reformers are very concerned. And Xi may not make it to the 21st Party Congress in 2027. Even is Xi wins his political battles, he won't be able to move against Taiwan in the foreseeable future. RUSSIA/UKRAINE: 11. Russia has lost a major source of drones with Iran being taken offline. Under Ukrainian bombardments petroleum infrastructure in Western Russia, Russia's oil revenues have declined precipitously. Rumor (repeat, rumor!) has it that Putin is considering turning people's bank accounts into war bonds, and that he's considering universal conscription. Hardliners are calling Ukraine a distraction and urging him to go after the Baltics. Especially since they see the US is focused on Iran. It would take Putin months to call up 1 to 2 million more soldiers, and there are questions about whether they have enough weapons left in their stockpiles to arm them. 12. And Secretary of War Hegseth has reached out to Ukraine to assist with US drone defenses in the US Gulf (because our traditional missile defense systems don't seem to be working very well against Iranian drones). Zelenskyy responded favorably to the request, but he made it "clear Ukraine would help only on the condition that its own defence was not weakened and that there were diplomatic gains for Kyiv - suggesting, in particular, that Ukraine would be willing to swap its interceptor drones for more US Patriot air defences to protect against Russian ballistic missiles." (according to the BBC). Well, we've been blessed to be living interesting times.
bought Ṁ50 NO

betting 'no', because I think one paradoxical effect of the trade war is it lowers the probability of a Taiwan invasion.

what if its a peaceful takeover? is that considered a no?

@CF6508 From the market description:

"""
This question is answered "No" if there is:

  • no military conflict between the two parties

  • a limited military conflict without triggering a major war

"""

I.e. a peaceful takeover or anything with very limited conflict would be considered NO

I think both US candidates are pretty big hardliners against China, so I don’t see the election causing that much of a difference. While Trump has said that he wasn’t committed to the defense of Taiwan, I think that when push comes to shove he’d be in favor of it. I also believe that China itself knows this. The deciding factor for the invasion of Taiwan will the state of the Chinese economy. A really good or really bad economy would push the CCP toward war, either because they believe they’ll win (good economy) or to create a rally around the flag effect (bad economy). The so-so economy that China seems to be slipping into seems to be an indicator that they may not be willing to invade Taiwan.

Today

Does DPP's non-corporation with China increase the chance of invasion?

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